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What is an ‘absolute right’? Deciphering absoluteness in the context of Article 3 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights 
 
Natasa Mavronicola* 
 
 
Abstract 
The answer to the question of what it means to say that a right is absolute is 
often taken for granted, yet still sparks doubt and scepticism. This article 
investigates absoluteness further, bringing rights theory and the judicial 
approach on an absolute right together. A theoretical framework is set up that 
addresses two distinct but potentially related parameters of investigation: the 
first is what I have labelled the ‘applicability’ criterion, which looks at 
whether and when the applicability of the standard referred to as absolute can 
be displaced, in other words whether other considerations can justify its 
infringement; the second parameter, which I have labelled the ‘specification’ 
criterion, explores the degree to which and bases on which the content of the 
standard characterised as absolute is specified. This theoretical framework is 
then used to assess key principles and issues that arise in the Strasbourg 
Court’s approach to Article 3. It is suggested that this analysis allows us to 
explore both the distinction and the interplay between the two parameters in 
the judicial interpretation of the right and that appreciating the significance of 
this is fundamental to the understanding of and discourse on the concept of an 
absolute right.  
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Reference to ‘absolute rights’ abounds in adjudication and academic commentary.1 
Nonetheless, the meaning of absoluteness as a characteristic of (certain) human rights has not 
been explored in sufficient depth and causes significant uncertainty. This article seeks to 
investigate the meaning and implications of absoluteness, to better understand the uncertainty 
and problems surrounding it. The aim is to unpack the notion of an absolute right through 
setting out a theoretical framework and looking at the European Court of Human Rights’2 
approach to Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights
3
 (ECHR) in light of this 
framework. The article begins by clarifying and explaining the focus of analysis; the 
controversy surrounding the concept of an ‘absolute right’ is then briefly outlined; it is then 
addressed by means of a theoretical framework consisting of two parameters: applicability 
and specification. These are considered in turn, with discussion of their role and significance 
in theory and in ECtHR discourse. 
 
Deciphering ‘absoluteness’ 
 
There is very little discussion of the meaning of the concept of ‘absolute right’. Much of the 
academic interest on the topic has revolved around the moral debate: Are there any absolute 
moral rights? This translates into a debate of whether there should be any absolute legal 
rights. Instances of the normative debate abound,
4
 encompassing also the moral divide 
between deontological and consequentialist positions and the more specific but widespread 
debate surrounding emergency constitutions (including arguments in favour of the 
legalisation of torture).
5
 Yet the article’s investigation is both antecedent and posterior to the 
                                                          
* PhD Candidate in Law, University of Cambridge (nm407@cam.ac.uk). I am grateful to Professor David 
Feldman for his invaluable guidance and to Dr Stephanie Palmer, Dr Roger O’Keefe and the anonymous 
referees for their valuable and constructive comments. 
1
 For instance, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights refers to ‘absolute rights such as 
those guaranteed by Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention’ in Ilaşcu v Moldova and Russia 2004-VII; 40 EHRR 46 
at para 334. Courts often refer to rights’ non-absolute nature. For instance, the assertion in a recent Supreme 
Court judgment that ‘[t]he privilege against self-incrimination is not an absolute right’: see Ambrose v Harris 
[2011] UKSC 43 at [34] and [56] (per Lord Hope). Commentary often alludes to the significance of 
absoluteness without explaining it fully. See, for instance, Letsas, ‘Strasbourg's interpretive ethic: lessons for the 
international lawyer’ (2010) 21 European Journal of International Law 509 at 510: ‘Naturally, the reasoning 
that figures in the interpretation of qualified rights (e.g., the principle of proportionality) will often differ from 
that of absolute rights.’   
2
 ECtHR, ‘the Strasbourg Court’ or ‘the Court’. 
3
 Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,  1950, ETS 5 
(ECHR or ‘the Convention’). 
4
 See, for example, the discussion between Gewirth and Levinson: Gewirth, ‘Are There Any Absolute Rights?’ 
(1981) 31 The Philosophical Quarterly 1; Levinson, ‘Gewirth on Absolute Rights’ (1982) 32 The Philosophical 
Quarterly 73; and Gewirth, ‘There are Absolute Rights’ (1982) 32 The Philosophical Quarterly 348.  
5
 See, for example, Ackerman, 'The Emergency Constitution' (2004) 113 Yale Law Journal 1029; and 
Dershowitz, ‘Tortured Reasoning’, in Levinson (ed.), Torture: A Collection (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
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question of whether the law should provide for absolute rights. It explores a question which is 
certainly antecedent to the debate: what is an absolute right? At the same time, it does so in 
light of judicial discourse in the interpretation of what jurists confirm to be an absolute right 
at law. 
 The starting point here is that Article 3 is absolute at law: it is labelled as ‘absolute’ 
and declared to be applied as such by the ECtHR, ‘the authentic representatives, the 
mouthpiece of the law’.6 Thus this article is not normative, prescriptive or justificatory 
insofar as it does not seek to answer questions as to whether there are absolute moral rights or 
whether there should be absolute legal rights. Instead, it asks what absoluteness means. In 
doing so, a theoretical framework is set up to facilitate clarity of analysis in relation to two 
key parameters: that of applicability and that of specification (explained further below). 
However, it does not purport to elide the implications of normative standpoints on the 
theoretical framework against which the Court’s discourse is evaluated.7 
 It is important to distinguish this project from that pursued by Addo and Grief in their 
article: ‘Does Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights Enshrine Absolute 
Rights?’8 Addo and Grief appear to take a certain theoretical approach to the meaning of 
absolute right as a given – borrowed entirely from Gewirth’s discussion on morally absolute 
rights
9
 – and proceed to assert its quasi-/overall fulfilment but also its limitations10 through 
analysis of the case law on Article 3. Their analysis does not explore in depth what it means 
for a right to be absolute, but rather investigates to what extent Article 3 fulfils the 
description of a particular theory of absolute rights. More importantly, they do not explain 
exactly why and how the ‘factual and personal distinctions’11 involved in Article 3’s 
interpretation impact on absoluteness: in particular, they hint at – but do not fully elaborate 
on – the significance of the distinction but also of the potential interplay between the 
applicability and specification of the right, which is examined closely here, with a view to 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
2004); cf Cole, 'The Priority of Morality: The Emergency Constitution's Blind Spot' (2004) 113 Yale Law 
Journal 1753. See also Gross, ‘Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always be 
Constitutional?’ (2003) 112 Yale Law Journal 1011; and the wider debate on torture in Levinson (ed.), Torture: 
A Collection (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
6
 Raz, ‘Hart on Moral Rights and Legal Duties’ (1984) 4 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 123 at 131. 
7
 There is ample debate on whether there can be any purely descriptive analysis of law. For a critical exposition, 
see Eng, ‘Fusion of Descriptive and Normative Propositions. The Concepts of `Descriptive Proposition' and 
`Normative Proposition' as Concepts of Degree’ (2000) 13 Ratio Juris 239. 
8
 Addo and Grief, 'Does Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights Enshrine Absolute Rights?' 
(1998) 9 European Journal of International Law 510. 
9
 Gewirth, ‘Are There Any Absolute Rights?’, supra n 4. 
10
 Addo and Grief, ‘Does Article 3 ECHR Enshrine Absolute Rights?’, supra n 8 at 515-6. 
11
 Ibid. at 515. 
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addressing some of the uncertainty and scepticism surrounding the concept of an absolute 
right, as explained below. 
 
The choice of right and scope of analysis 
 
Article 3 of the ECHR is the choice of focus for a number of reasons. Crucially, it has been 
expounded to be an ‘absolute right’ by the judicial institution interpreting the ECHR, the 
ECtHR,
12
 over a significant length of time,
13
 producing a rich body of case law
14
 dealing with 
Article 3’s application in a range of situations. This means that it provides fertile ground for 
an exploration of judicial discourse on what it means for a right to be absolute.  
 Moreover, such focus enables consideration of a right recognised as an ‘absolute’ 
human right, lying outside the isolated constitutional discourse and experiences of a 
particular country. An example of a constitutional ‘absolute right’ would be Germany’s right 
to dignity, found in Article 1(1) of the Grundgesetz.
15
 Yet an analysis of this right would 
inevitably take us down the path of constitutional theory, not least German constitutional 
theory, and away from the notion of absolute human rights. 
If the aim is to explore the notion of an absolute human right, why select a regional 
system of rights protection? The answer lies in the idea of exploring it in judicial discourse. 
The ECHR system, operating within the Council of Europe and applicable in 47 Contracting 
States, is unique in the adjudicatory model it provides. Its special nature lies in three key 
attributes. The first is the existence of a permanent, full-time Court with automatically 
compulsory jurisdiction. Protocol No. 11 has made the Court a permanent institution with full-
time judges, replacing the European Commission of Human Rights and the original Court, 
                                                          
12
 The wording used by the Court varies, with the oft-repeated statement being that ‘[t]he Convention prohibits 
in absolute terms torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’ (Ireland v United Kingdom A 25 
(1978); 2 EHRR 25 at para 163). The Court also refers to ‘the absolute character of Article 3’ (Chahal v United 
Kingdom 1996-V; 23 EHRR 413 at para 96) and to Article 3 as an ‘absolute right’ (Al-Adsani v United Kingdom 
34 EHRR 11 at para 59). 
13
 The first finding of a breach of Article 3 by the Strasbourg Court was in 1978, in Ireland v United Kingdom, 
ibid.; but see also De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp v Belgium A 12 (1970); 1 EHRR 373 (no breach of Article 3 
found for disciplinary punishments) and the Commission Report in The Greek Case (Denmark, Norway, Sweden 
and the Netherlands v Greece) (1969) 12 Yearbook 186. 
14
 This includes over 850 findings of violation of Article 3, based on 50 YEARS OF ACTIVITY: The European 
Court of Human Rights – Some Facts and Figures (provisional edition, Strasbourg: April 2010) at 14-15, 
available at: http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/ACD46A0F-615A-48B9-89D6-
8480AFCC29FD/0/FactsAndFigures_EN.pdf [last accessed 4 July 2012]. 
15
 Article 1(1) Grundgesetz (the German Basic Law) provides: ‘Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect 
and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority.’ 
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making the ECHR process ‘wholly judicial’.16 The second, related attribute is the right of 
individual petition, allowing for direct access to the Court for over 800 million people within 
the jurisdiction of the Contracting States.
17
 Thirdly, the system benefits from robust 
implementation mechanisms. Formal oversight of implementation is conducted by the 
Committee of Ministers
18
 while the Directorate General of Human Rights offers assistance 
and advice on compliance through close co-operation with State authorities. The final ‘stick 
in the cupboard’ is expulsion from the Council of Europe, which could cause great 
difficulties for a State seeking, or seeking to maintain, European Union membership.
19
 
 Thus a focus on Article 3 allows us to assess the notion of ‘absolute right’ in a sui 
generis sphere, as an absolute human right whose interpretation has been the subject of rich 
judicial ‘output’. For the purposes of this article, the focus is on Article 3 as a legally absolute 
right strictly within – and not beyond – the legal order of the ECHR, as identified by the 
Strasbourg Court.
20
 The article does not purport to explain notions that may be considered 
related to the concept of an absolute right at a broader international law level, such as 
peremptory norms of international law or norms comprising erga omnes obligations, although 
aspects of the discussion below may be of interest to those analysing such norms. 
 Another question may well be: why select Article 3 of the ECHR and not another 
right enshrined in the ECHR? The answer is that Article 3 is prominently referred to as 
absolute by academics,
21
 by domestic institutions (ranging from courts
22
 to ministries
23
) of 
                                                          
16
 European Court of Human Rights: Annual Report 2009 (Registry of the European Court of Human Rights, 
Strasbourg, 2010) at 10, available at: http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/C25277F5-BCAE-4401-BC9B-
F58D015E4D54/0/2009_Annual_Report_Final.pdf [last accessed 4 July 2012]. 
17
 The right of individual petition was originally an option. Gradually, it became recognised by all Contracting 
States. Protocol No 11 rendered the recognition of the right of individual petition compulsory. This right 
pertains to natural and legal persons, groups of individuals and to non-governmental organisations. 
18
 See Article 46(2) ECHR. 
19
 Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union (European Union, Consolidated version of the Treaty on European 
Union, 13 December 2007, 2008/C 115/01) provides that the European Union (EU) is founded on the values, inter 
alia, of ‘respect for human rights’. Moreover, the EU’s accession to the ECHR has been enabled through Article 
6(2) of the Treaty on European Union. Lastly, Article 6(3) of the same provides: ‘Fundamental rights, as 
guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms…shall 
constitute general principles of the Union's law.’ 
20
 On this issue, see Loizidou v Turkey 1996-VI; 23 EHRR 513, Banković and Others v United Kingdom 2001-
XII; 44 EHRR SE5. See also Behrami and Another v France and Saramati v France, Germany and Norway 45 
EHRR SE10 and the recent decisions in Al-Skeini and Others v United Kingdom 53 EHRR 18 and Hirsi Jamaa 
and Others v Italy Application No 27765/09, Merits, 23 February 2012. 
21
 See, for example, Feldman, Civil Liberties and Human Rights in England and Wales, 2nd edn (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2002) at 242; Foster, Human Rights & Civil Liberties, 2nd edn (Essex: Pearson 
Education, 2008) at 27; White and Ovey, Jacobs, White and Ovey: The European Convention on Human Rights,  
5th edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) at chapter 9. 
22
 See, for example, R (Wellington) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] UKHL 72 at [40] (per 
Lord Scott). 
23
 See, for example, The Human Rights Framework as a Tool for Regulators and Inspectorates (Ministry of 
Justice, UK 2009) at 12, available at:  
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Contracting States such as the United Kingdom and in the Strasbourg Court’s case law 
itself.
24
 With regard to Article 3, the label ‘absolute’ is almost always the starting point, even 
if to be challenged. Other rights do not seem to attract the same label or attention with such 
consensus.  
 Nonetheless, while the choice of focus is Article 3 due to its prominence in ‘absolute 
rights’ discourse and case law, I do not wish the above to be seen as a dismissal of the 
possibility of envisaging other rights under the ECHR as absolute. Indeed, the theoretical 
framework provided below can be used to explore whether and on what basis other rights 
within the ECHR can be seen to be absolute. 
 
Applicability and specification: theory and case law 
 
Discourse on the concept of an ‘absolute right’ is bedevilled by an uncertainty and scepticism 
that is not easy to penetrate at first sight. For instance, although Feldman states that the 
obligations of states under Article 3 are ‘absolute, non-derogable and unqualified’,25 he 
remarks that ‘a degree of relativism cannot, in practice, be entirely excluded from the 
application of the notions of inhuman or degrading treatment’.26 Fenwick goes as far as to 
assert that ‘…[the standard of treatment that qualifies as Article 3 ill-treatment] does not 
connote an absolute standard and, in its application, it allows for a measure of discretion’.27 
Such commentary raises the question of how ‘relativism’ and the delimitation of a right relate 
to absoluteness. Crucially, it also highlights the preliminary need for conceptual clarity.  
 The controversy surrounding the concept of an ‘absolute right’ can be distilled into 
three rather interwoven questions:  
1. What are the key implications of a right’s ‘absoluteness’ on the obligations it comprises? 
2. How does a right’s ‘absoluteness’ affect the substance of what it prohibits or requires? 
3. What is the role of ‘relativism’ in the interpretation of an ‘absolute’ right? 
 The formulation of a theoretical framework to help address these questions can be 
facilitated through a distinction between two criteria or parameters.
28
 The first, which focuses 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/uploaded_files/humanrights/HRO/moj_guide_regulators_inspectorates.pd
f > [last accessed 4  July 2012].  
24
 See, for example, Chahal v United Kingdom, supra n 12 at paras 79-80. 
25
 Feldman, Civil Liberties and Human Rights, supra n 21 at 242. 
26
 Ibid.  
27
 Fenwick, Civil Liberties and Human Rights, 3rd edn (London: Cavendish Publishing, 2004) at 44-5. 
28
 The word ‘criterion’ and ‘parameter’ will be used interchangeably. 
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on the question of whether and when the applicability of a standard
29
 can be lawfully 
‘displaced’ by other considerations, can be labelled the applicability criterion. The second, 
which focuses on the question of the level and bases of specification
30
 of a standard, can be 
labelled the specification criterion. In essence, the latter element focuses on the definition and 
delimitation of a standard. Drawing this distinction does not mean to suggest that there is 
never any interplay between these two criteria, but is rather used as a classification of two 
different levels at which analysis of absoluteness can lie. Indeed, specification, which 
consists of defining and delimiting the standard, is what determines if it applies. The 
applicability criterion then determines whether its requirements can be lawfully displaced or 
not by conflicting or competing considerations. The potential interplay between the two 
criteria will be explored below. 
 
The applicability parameter: theory 
 
Both theorists who support and those who dispute the existence of absolute moral rights, or 
rights that should be recognised as absolute at law, take a particular stance on the applicability 
parameter of the right. This is encapsulated by Gewirth as follows: ‘A right is absolute when 
it cannot be overridden in any circumstances, so that it can never be justifiably infringed and 
it must be fulfilled without any exceptions.’31 
 Gewirth analyses this in the following way: The starting point is that, as per the 
Hohfeldian model,
32
 the absoluteness pertains to claim-rights, that is, justified entitlements to 
the performance of correlative duties. Applying this to human rights discourse, the 
entitlements can be said to be to the performance of correlative duties by the state. The right 
is fulfilled when its correlative duty is performed (including a duty to refrain from a 
particular act) and is infringed when its correlative duty is not carried out. The right is 
violated when it is unjustifiably infringed. Lastly, the right is overridden when it is justifiably 
infringed. Thus, absolute rights can never be justifiably infringed, according to Gewirth. In 
other words, no considerations can displace them once they are found to apply: if they apply, 
                                                          
29
 I use the word ‘standard’ here to allow room for exploring the way rights and correlative duties interact with 
matters of applicability and specification. 
30
 The term ‘specification’ is here taken to refer to specifying, in the sense of identifying clearly and definitely 
as per the definition in Soanes (ed), The Paperback Oxford English Dictionary, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2002) and not to any other technical or legal term.  
31
 Gewirth, ‘Are There Any Absolute Rights?’, supra n 4 at 2.  
32
 See Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1919). 
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they must be fulfilled, and infringement automatically amounts to a violation,
33
 which is 
unlawful.  
 Thus, to give an (imaginary) example, an absolute legal right not to be killed would 
encompass an obligation on State agents not to kill anyone; no consideration, including one 
of necessity or self-defence, could operate to override the right; any killing by State agents 
would amount to a violation of the right and would be unlawful. A consequentialist approach 
– broadly looking at the (undesirable) consequences of not interfering with the right or the 
(desirable) consequences of interfering with it – would have no place in determining the 
lawfulness of infringing the right.  
 This can be further clarified by contrasting it with a right not considered to be 
absolute. If a right – say, for example, the right to freedom of expression – provides that it 
can be lawfully interfered with in pursuit of the protection of reputation or can be derogated 
from in particular circumstances, this means that certain considerations can operate to 
override the right – not all restrictions on freedom of expression would amount to violations 
and therefore be unlawful. 
 This approach to the criterion of applicability is adopted by many others. For instance, 
it is taken for granted by Levinson,
34
 who attacks Gewirth on the moral question (are there 
any absolute moral rights?) without disputing his approach to the applicability criterion of 
absoluteness. Dershowitz, prominent in his critique on the absolute prohibition of torture, 
appears to be taking the prohibition as legally non-displaceable and condemn this state of 
affairs.
35
 Similar approaches are taken in legal textbooks. Foster, for instance, describes 
absolute rights as ‘those rights that cannot be interfered with whatever the justification’.36 
Commentators thus appear to agree that on the applicability criterion, absoluteness entails 
that nothing can override the right insofar as it applies in a given situation. This can be 
                                                          
33
 The analysis here adopts Gewirth’s approach but places it strictly within a legal theoretical framework, so that 
‘infringement’ means interfering with or acting contrary to a right and ‘violation’ means doing so unlawfully. 
Thus it is necessary to read Jarvis Thompson’s perspective on infringement and violation substituting the adverb 
‘unlawfully’ for the adverb ‘wrongly’: ‘[s]uppose that someone has a right that such and such shall not be the 
case. I shall say that we infringe a right of his if and only if we bring about that it is the case. I shall say that we 
violate a right of his if and only if both we bring about that it is the case and we act wrongly in doing so.’ Jarvis 
Thomson, ‘Some Ruminations on Rights’, in Parent (ed.), Rights, Restitution, and Risk (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1986) at 51. See also Thomson, The Realm of Rights (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1990) at 122. For a critique of the moral implications of the infringement/violation distinction, 
see Oberdiek, ‘Lost in Moral Space: On the Infringing/Violating Distinction and its Place in the Theory of 
Rights’ (2004) 23 Law and Philosophy 325.  
34
 See Levinson, ‘Gewirth on Absolute Rights’, supra n 4. 
35
 See Dershowitz, supra n 5 at 257. 
36
 Foster, supra n 21 at 27. See also Sieghart, The International Law of Human Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1983) at 161, cited in Feldman, Civil Liberties and Human Rights, supra n 21 at 242: ‘All that is therefore 
required to establish a violation…is a finding that the state concerned has failed to comply with its obligation in 
respect of any one of these modes of conduct: no question of justification can ever arise.’  
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accepted as the starting point in the theoretical framework on the applicability criterion of 
absolute rights. 
 Yet what if the conflicting considerations are also rights? Indeed, normative critics 
who argue against the existence of absolute moral rights or the recognition of absolute rights 
in law tend to frame instances of the ‘ticking bomb’ scenario in the form of a conflict of 
rights. The debate is relevant in establishing where the applicability criterion stands in such 
conflict. Gewirth grapples with such an example: the admittedly unlikely scenario whereby a 
group of political extremists announce that they will use an arsenal of nuclear weapons 
against a designated large distant city unless Abrams, a politically active lawyer in the city, 
tortures his mother to death in public. Gewirth recognises that a consequentialist argument 
might well portray this as a conflict of rights:  
 
[I]t may be argued that the morally correct description of the alternative 
confronting Abrams is not simply that it is one of not violating or violating an 
innocent person’s right to life, but rather not violating one innocent person’s 
right to life and thereby violating the right to life of thousands of other innocent 
persons through being partly responsible for their deaths, or violating one 
innocent person’s right to life and thereby protecting or fulfilling the right to life 
of thousands of other innocent persons.
37
 
 
Gewirth rejects this analysis of the situation by putting forward the doctrine of novus actus 
interveniens. He posits that: 
 
According to this principle, when there is a causal connection between some 
person A’s performing some action (or inaction) X and some other person C’s 
incurring a certain harm Z, A’s moral responsibility for Z is removed if, between 
X and Z, there intervenes some other action Y of some person B who knows the 
relevant circumstances of his action and who intends to produce Z or who 
produces Z through recklessness. The reason for this removal is that B’s 
intervening action Y is the more direct or proximate cause of Z and, unlike A’s 
action (or inaction), Y is the sufficient condition of Z as it actually occurs.
38
 
 
                                                          
37
 Gewirth, ‘Are There Any Absolute Rights?’, supra n 4 at 9. 
38
 Ibid. at 12. 
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 The problem with this argument is that it appears to contradict Gewirth’s recognition 
that a right can encompass both positive and negative obligations. It addresses the issue in a 
way that eliminates positive obligations insofar as there is an intervention by a human agent 
with intent or recklessness. It would mean that the right not to suffer inhuman treatment, for 
example, does not involve a correlative duty on the State to protect from rape at the hands of 
a malicious person with the requisite intent.
39
 Gewirth himself sets up his definition of an 
absolute right in a way that captures both negative and positive obligations, as he states that 
rights are ‘justified…entitlements to the carrying out of correlative duties, positive or 
negative…in the latter, negative case, the requirement constitutes a prohibition’.40 He 
considers that absolute rights encompass ‘the exceptionless justifiability of performing or not 
performing those actions as required’.41 This affirms his assertion that absolute rights ‘must 
be fulfilled without any exceptions’.42  
 Human rights discourse, which centres on the duties owed to individuals by the State, 
similarly upholds the idea that rights encompass both negative and positive obligations. 
Fredman posits that: ‘all rights, regardless of their nature, can give rise to positive as well as 
negative obligations on the state. Even a quintessential civil right such as the right to a fair 
trial requires the state to provide an adequate court system’.43 Indeed, Shue classifies the 
correlative duties of rights into three groups: duties of restraint, duties to protect and duties to 
provide.
44
 As Fredman explains, these encompass ‘the primary duty whereby the state should 
not interfere; the secondary duty whereby the state should protect individuals against other 
individuals; and the tertiary duty to facilitate or provide for individuals’.45 Crucially, also, the 
ECtHR has a rich body of case law on positive obligations encompassed by Convention 
rights.
46
 Keir Starmer has commented that ‘positive obligations are the hallmark of the 
European Convention on Human Rights’.47 
 This raises the possibility of a conundrum: what if negative and positive obligations 
that pertain to the same absolute right conflict? Indeed, can the negative and positive 
                                                          
39
 Indeed, this would run counter to the ECtHR’s position in MC v Bulgaria 2003-XII; 40 EHRR 20. 
40
 Gewirth, ‘Are There Any Absolute Rights?’, supra n 4 at 2. 
41
 Ibid. 
42
 Ibid. and supra n 31. 
43
 Fredman, ‘Human Rights Transformed: Positive Duties and Positive Rights’ [2006] Public Law 498 at 500. 
44
 Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence and U.S. Foreign Policy, 2nd edn (Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1996) at 35. 
45
 Fredman, supra n 43 at 500 (emphasis added). 
46
 See Mowbray, The Development of Positive Obligations Under the European Convention on Human Rights 
by the European Court of Human Rights (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004). 
47
 Starmer, ‘Positive Obligations Under the Convention’, in Jowell and Cooper (eds), Understanding Human 
Rights Principles (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2001) at 159. 
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obligations pertaining to the same absolute right conflict without taking away all analytical 
coherence? If absolute rights can never be overridden and must be fulfilled without 
exception, how is this conundrum to be addressed? There is a way to save the absolutist’s 
thesis. It can be saved by refuting the idea that there is a clash of absolutes. The proposition is 
this: there is no positive duty to act in a way that constitutes a violation of the negative duty 
encompassed by an absolute right. Let us take something close to a realistic scenario as an 
example: the police have arrested a person they know to be involved in the kidnap of a ten-
year-old child who may be facing ill-treatment or risk of death at the hands of other 
kidnappers or a high degree of suffering or risk of death in an unknown location with no food 
or shelter. In such a scenario, it is difficult to argue that there is no positive duty to take 
action to avert the risk of suffering or death either at the hands of third parties or as the result 
of his passive situation. In fact, a number of duties including effective investigation and 
deployment of forces, as well as interrogating the kidnapper, obviously arise. Yet this does 
not preclude delimiting such duties in a way that excludes taking action that amounts to a 
violation of the negative duty of an absolute right. This is a matter of specification of positive 
duties rather than of certain considerations overriding the positive duties under an absolute 
right: that is, there is no positive duty to torture or use violence against the kidnapper in order 
to discover the child’s whereabouts.48  
 To facilitate the differentiation between the applicability and specification parameters 
in this context, the discourse can be linked to Kant’s idea of perfect and imperfect duties.49 
Rainbolt elaborates on a particular interpretation of the distinction between perfect and 
imperfect duties, describing it as one between obligations without latitude and obligations 
with latitude.
50
 Rainbolt seeks to show that the distinction is actually one of degree – a 
‘scalar’ rather than ‘non-scalar’ one51 – and that on further investigation it can be seen that 
many obligations that we consider perfect could be labelled as ‘imperfect’. His starting point 
is defining obligation itself: 
 
Doing act-tokens of type T is obligatory if and only if  
                                                          
48
 Indeed, this appears to be the approach taken by the ECtHR in Gäfgen v Germany 52 EHRR 1, examined 
below. 
49
 This distinction is brought up in two key works: see Kant, The Moral Law: Kant’s Groundwork of the 
Metaphysics of Morals (Paton tr/ed, London: Routledge, 1976) at 84; and in Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals 
(Gregor tr/ed, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) at 153. 
50
 Rainbolt, ‘Perfect and Imperfect Obligations’, (2000) 98 Philosophical Studies 233 at 233. 
51
 Ibid. at 242. 
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1. there is a nonempty set, S, the set of act-tokens of type T such that doing 
members of S is permitted, and 
2. there is a nonempty set, A, the set of all subsets of S such that 
a. doing all the act-tokens in any one of the sets in A is morally good, and 
b. failing to do all the act-tokens in one of the sets in A is morally wrong.
52
 
 
In his description, ‘act-tokens’ are, according to a particular strand of action theory, particular 
concrete acts while an ‘act-type’ is an act-property,53 such that ‘buying a car’ is an act-type, 
while act-tokens would consist of ‘buying a second-hand Citroën C3 on credit from my 
uncle’ and a huge number of other possible concrete acts.54 A perfect obligation, according to 
Rainbolt, exists when one has an obligation to do precisely one particular set of act-tokens. 
All other obligations are, to a degree, imperfect. Distilling Rainbolt’s erudite commentary, 
most obligations to do an act-type are ‘imperfect’ in the sense that there is a degree of latitude 
as to how they can be fulfilled. Transposing this to the positive obligations of absolute rights, 
it can be proposed that, reflecting on Kant’s original distinction as analysed by Rainbolt, a 
positive obligation on the State to protect people from a type of treatment or suffering is, like 
most positive obligations, imperfect: in the sense that even though protecting people from 
proscribed harm is at all times obligatory, such protection can be fulfilled through variable 
act-tokens which may be limited – that is, not boundless – in scope. 
 Can the original formulation of the applicability criterion by Gewirth survive the 
above analysis? It appears that it can. The fact that the positive obligations encompassed by 
an absolute right do not include the obligation to act in a way that infringes the negative 
obligation of an absolute right is a definitional point, and thus a matter of specification rather 
than of applicability. Indeed, the fact that the positive obligations encompassed by an 
absolute right are not boundless does not mean that they are displaceable – that is, capable of 
being overridden. It does mean, however, that setting their boundaries – the process of 
specification – is a very significant process indeed. Linked to this, the fact that the positive 
obligations encompassed by an absolute right may involve a degree of variability and 
uncertainty in the action required to fulfil them does not entail that they are displaceable. At 
the same time, seeing that the maintenance of the applicability criterion on the negative 
                                                          
52
 Ibid. 
53
 Ibid. at 235. 
54
 Act-tokens can be ‘concretised’ further and further: for instance, ‘buying a second-hand Citroën C3 on credit 
from my uncle’ could be specified into ’buying a second-hand 2003 Citroën C3 from my uncle Peter Smith for 
the price of £4000, the transfer of ownership to take place on 24 November 2012, payment to take place in 
monthly instalments of £200 beginning on 1 November 2012’ etc. 
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obligation(s) encompassed by an absolute right requires a particular specification of the 
positive obligation(s) encompassed by the same right indicates the potential interplay 
between the two criteria, which is addressed further below.  
 What about a clash between an absolute right and a right not considered absolute? In 
this regard, it can be argued that the concept of an ‘absolute right’ entails a hierarchy of 
rights, so that the duties encompassed by an absolute right cannot be displaced by conflicting 
requirements embodied in non-absolute rights. This is not an uncontroversial proposition, 
considering the label ‘indivisible’ given to human rights in the Vienna Declaration,55 yet 
academic commentary
56
 confirms that the proclaimed ‘indivisibility’ of human rights is 
belied by the existence at law of ‘non-derogable rights’.57 Ashworth points out this hierarchy 
within the ECHR, which is the focus of this article.
58
 This is surely right. Non-derogable 
rights can be viewed as the ultimate trump card
59
 in the sense that they cannot be lawfully 
departed from by virtue of any other considerations: this is, in effect, the applicability 
parameter of absoluteness. This is contrasted with derogable and ‘qualified’ rights:60 these 
can be displaced by the State in cases of emergency insofar as necessitated by the exigencies 
of the situation or in the pursuit of a legitimate aim insofar as necessary in a democratic 
society respectively.  Absolute rights, on the applicability criterion, thus reflect exactly this 
idea of a hierarchy, whose corollary is that an absolute right – being non-displaceable by any 
other considerations – cannot be ‘trumped’ by a derogable, or qualified, right, especially 
considering that  the latter allows for interference in pursuit of a legitimate aim.  
 There is another challenge for the original formulation of the applicability criterion. 
This comes in the form of what can be labelled the ‘practicality’ argument. The critique tends 
to take the following line: in theory, rights labelled as absolute can never be justifiably 
infringed; but in practice, for all sorts of reasons including unlawful State action, general de 
facto State inaction, failure to investigate effectively, ‘failure’ by the victims to claim their 
rights or to take legal action on a violation of their rights, even failure to set out their 
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pleadings in the requisite manner, the right ends up not being respected. A potent example of 
lack of enforcement is the problematic situation of Russian prisons, which has been 
repeatedly highlighted by NGOs such as Amnesty International as an endemic problem.
61
 
Another article by Addo and Grief
62
 exemplifies this critique.  
 There are two ways to address the above critique. First of all, it appears to equate 
legal inviolability with physical inviolability. The use of the modal verb ‘can’ is perhaps the 
key to this: can and cannot are used interchangeably to mean permission/prohibition as well 
as possibility/impossibility. These two meanings are distinct. When it is said of a right that it 
cannot be interfered with, this is not – at least certainly not within this theoretical framework 
– a reference to ‘physical’ impossibility. Thus it is inapposite to argue, without more, that the 
possibility of violation or of a violation being left without redress refutes a prohibition. The 
prohibition of murder, for example, is no less applicable even if a particularly bloodthirsty 
and clever serial murderer manages to kill and escape the police on two dozen occasions. 
Concluding otherwise effectively amounts to committing a form of the ‘is’ – ‘ought’ fallacy 
(in the sense that ‘is not’ is equated with ‘ought not’). At the same time, there is something 
problematic about limited enforcement in practice of a legally absolute right. It is problematic 
because the absolute prohibition stems from recognition of the gravity of the infringement. 
But this gravity is the reason for rendering a right absolute and it is also the reason for 
seeking high enforcement levels. The applicability parameter is not conceptually affected by 
practical barriers to enforcement. Yet the need for effective protection of a legally inviolable 
right should arguably play a role in interpreting the right, in the specification of the duties it 
encompasses, as suggested below. 
 
The applicability parameter: ECtHR case law 
 
It is now important to examine the Court’s approach and whether it is consistent with the 
theory on the applicability parameter. The Court focuses its discourse on what absoluteness 
entails on a juxtaposition, looking at it in relation to the ‘qualification’ of rights: in the form 
of lawful derogations, exceptions or interferences (as opposed to unlawful violations of 
rights).  
                                                          
61
 See, for example, Amnesty International, ‘Take a Step to Stamp Out Torture’ (2000) ACT 40/013/2000, 
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 The ECtHR’s discourse is consistent on this point. The primary and constantly 
reiterated statement is the following: 
 
The Convention prohibits in absolute terms torture and inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment, irrespective of the victim's conduct. Unlike most of 
the substantive clauses of the Convention and of Protocols 1 and 4, Article 3 
makes no provision for exceptions and, under Article 15(2), there can be no 
derogation therefrom even in the event of a public emergency threatening the 
life of the nation.
63
  
  
This reflects the idea, embodied in the applicability criterion, that an absolute right is one that 
can never be justifiably infringed and must be fulfilled without exception. In response to 
arguments relating to States’ overwhelming need to protect themselves and their citizens 
from the threat of terrorism, the ECtHR has added:  
 
Article 3 enshrines one of the most fundamental values of democratic society. 
The Court is well aware of the immense difficulties faced by States in modern 
times in protecting their communities from terrorist violence. However, even 
in these circumstances, the Convention prohibits in absolute terms torture or 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, irrespective of the victim's 
conduct.
64
 
 
 Indeed, in what can be described as a real life ticking bomb scenario, the ECtHR’s 
Grand Chamber has recently addressed the subjection of a kidnapper to threats of torture with a 
view to revealing the whereabouts and potentially saving the life of the kidnapped child (upon 
which the kidnapper confessed to the murder of the child) and maintained its stance:  
 
The Court has confirmed that even in the most difficult circumstances, such as 
the fight against terrorism and organised crime, the Convention prohibits in 
absolute terms torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, 
irrespective of the conduct of the person concerned. The nature of the offence 
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 Ireland v United Kingdom, supra n 12 at para 163.  
64
 Chahal v United Kingdom, supra n 12 at para 79. See also Saadi v Italy 49 EHRR 30 at para 127. 
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allegedly committed by the applicant is therefore irrelevant for the purposes of 
art.3.
65
 
 
The ECtHR proceeded to find that the threats of torture amounted to inhuman treatment 
contrary to Article 3. 
 The above statements are adopted by the Strasbourg Court in almost the entire body 
of substantive case law on Article 3 of the ECHR. The ECtHR’s approach can be condensed 
to three main elements. First, Article 3 makes no provision for lawful exceptions – in contrast 
to other Articles within the ECHR, there is no possibility of lawful interference that is 
‘necessary in a democratic society’66 for the fulfilment of a legitimate aim. An infringement 
of Article 3 is conclusively unlawful. Second, Article 15 ECHR, which governs the 
derogation from obligations under the ECHR in exceptional and restricted circumstances, 
does not allow for any derogation from Article 3 even in the event of a public emergency 
threatening the life of the nation (including the threat of terrorist violence).
67
 Lastly, the 
prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment applies irrespective 
of the victim’s conduct – this means that whether the victim or potential victim is an innocent 
child or a cold-blooded murderer
68
 or terrorist,
69
 they enjoy the protection of Article 3 alike.   
 The unqualified terms of Article 3 and the ECtHR’s categorical statements thus 
appear to indicate that Article 3’s absoluteness is interpreted consistently with the 
applicability criterion outlined above: it can never be justifiably infringed. Moreover, its 
applicability is not conditional on the ‘good’ behaviour of the victim or potential victim, so 
that such considerations can never affect its applicability. It is in these two senses that it is 
‘unqualified’70 and ‘unconditional’.71 
 The statements set out above refer consistently to ‘the prohibition’ embodied in 
Article 3, alluding to the negative obligation. Concerning the positive obligation, the 
ECtHR’s approach to the applicability criterion is reflected in its statements in Z v United 
Kingdom:  
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 Gäfgen v Germany, supra n 48 at para 87. 
66
 See ECHR, Articles 8(2), 9(2), 10(2), 11(2) etc. 
67
 Article 15(2) ECHR provides: ‘No derogation from Article 2, except in respect of deaths resulting from 
lawful acts of war, or from Articles 3, 4(1) and 7 shall be made under this provision.’ On this, see A v United 
Kingdom 49 EHRR 29. 
68
 Gäfgen v Germany, supra n 48. 
69
 Chahal v United Kingdom, supra n 12. 
70
 Palmer, ‘A Wrong Turning: Article 3 ECHR and Proportionality’ (2006) 65 Cambridge Law Journal 438 at 
447. 
71
 Ibid. at 450. 
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The Court re-iterates that Article 3 enshrines one of the most fundamental 
values of democratic society. It prohibits in absolute terms torture or inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment. The obligation on High Contracting 
Parties under Article 1 of the Convention to secure to everyone within their 
jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in the Convention, taken together 
with Article 3, requires States to take measures designed to ensure that 
individuals within their jurisdiction are not subjected to torture or inhuman or 
degrading treatment, including such ill-treatment administered by private 
individuals. These measures should provide effective protection, in particular, 
of children and other vulnerable persons and include reasonable steps to 
prevent ill-treatment of which the authorities had or ought to have had 
knowledge.
72
 
 
The right thus appears to trigger an umbrella duty on States to ‘take measures’ to protect 
individuals within their jurisdiction from the proscribed treatment. The Court also makes the 
following point in Opuz v Turkey:  
 
Nevertheless, it is not the Court’s role to replace the national authorities and to 
choose in their stead from among the wide range of possible measures that 
could be taken to secure compliance with their positive obligations under art.3 
of the Convention. Moreover, under art.19 of the Convention and under the 
principle that the Convention is intended to guarantee not theoretical or 
illusory, but practical and effective rights, the Court has to ensure that a state’s 
obligation to protect the rights of those under its jurisdiction is adequately 
discharged.
73
 
 
 This discourse indicates significant parallels with the perfect-imperfect duties theory 
set out above. It suggests that although there is always an umbrella duty to protect, the way to 
fulfil it may involve a degree of latitude – although, as Opuz indicates, with the ultimate 
check on adequacy lying in the hands of the ECtHR.  The positive obligations, once triggered, 
are thus not capable of being overridden – but what they encompass in each given situation is 
                                                          
72
 Z v United Kingdom 2001-V; 34 EHRR 3 at para 73. 
73
 Opuz v Turkey 50 EHRR 28 at para 165. Article 19 ECHR establishes the ECtHR as a permanent Court. 
18 
 
a matter of specification. 
  The above analysis suggests that both in theory and in the ECtHR’s discourse 
absoluteness entails that the relevant standard is non-displaceable. In other words, once it is 
found applicable, the right applies no matter what. Infringement of this right is thus 
conclusively unlawful. Therefore the key question becomes: what amounts to a breach of 
Article 3? Examining the content of the right shows that important questions arise even in 
relation to the applicability criterion.  
 
The specification parameter: theory 
 
Absoluteness may entail an either-or approach (either there is a breach of Article 3, which is 
conclusively unlawful, or there is not), but this means that the definitional question – the 
content of what is non-displaceable – takes centre stage. Hence the focal point here is the 
specification of such content, meaning the identification of what it encompasses in concrete 
terms. An obvious but often unstated point is that specification involves defining and 
delimiting the right. The length of this article does not permit a full coverage of the definition 
of Article 3, but seeks to highlight the significance of the level of specificity – or abstraction 
– as well as of the bases of specification of the right, in relation to its absolute nature. A 
theoretical framework that broadly attempts to reconcile bases of specification with the 
applicability criterion will be set out before examining the ECtHR’s case law. 
 A useful starting point is, once again, Gewirth, who sets out different levels of 
‘absolutism’.74 The reference to absolutism is to ‘absolutism’ or ‘absoluteness’ fulfilling the 
applicability criterion as set out above – that is, he sets up three different levels of 
abstraction/specification of non-displaceable standards. The three levels of ‘absolutism’ that 
he identifies are developed below in an attempt to set up the theoretical framework of 
specification as it relates to an absolute right.  
 1) Principle Absolutism: this maintains that what is non-displaceable is a very general 
moral principle, like Kant’s Categorical Imperative.75 Such a principle usually presents the 
subjects (beneficiaries), respondents (duty-bearers) and objects (the actual entitlement) of the 
right in a ‘relatively undifferentiated way, present[ing] a general formula for all the diverse 
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duties of all respondents…toward all subjects’.76  The problem is that principles of a high 
degree of generality, such as the idea that human life and dignity should be respected, are not 
sufficiently specified to address the operation of specific entitlements and obligations or the 
resolution of moral dilemmas (including apparent conflicts between rights, the issue raised 
earlier): for instance, the idea of subjecting a terrorist suspect to inhuman treatment with the 
aim of saving innocent lives. Hence, even if a principle at this level of generality is non-
displaceable in accordance with the applicability criterion, it is difficult – and in practice it is 
a judicial leap – to distil Hohfeldian rights from it.  
 2) Individual Absolutism: Gewirth places this on the other end of the spectrum, as it 
amounts to a highly specified absolute right. It is a particular person’s absolute (non-
displaceable) entitlement to a particular object in a particular geographic and chronological 
context and, as Gewirth sees it, when all reasons for overriding the right in the particular case 
have been overcome.
77
 In essence, individual absolutism tells us what someone is entitled to 
after external considerations have displaced any other potential entitlements and were either 
irrelevant or not important enough to displace the end result. The right is thus a post-
consequentialist residual entitlement. Shafer-Landau appears to accept this in his article 
‘Specifying Absolute Rights’, where he posits that sufficient ‘specification’ can render all 
moral rights absolute (on what was described above as the applicability criterion).
78
 This 
involves the ‘narrowing’ of all rights to encompass a number of exceptive clauses, which he 
calls, following Thomson, ‘full factual specification’:79 ‘On this view, there is no right to life 
simpliciter, but rather a right not to be killed except in circumstances A, B, C, etc. On this 
theory, rights are always absolute, i.e., are of the utmost stringency and can never be morally 
overridden. Any situation that appears to call for infringement is instead subsumed under one 
of the exceptive clauses.’80 
 Yet this interpretation of absoluteness reduces the applicability criterion to something 
virtually meaningless, relating only to a post-consequentialist residue. It therefore stands in 
stark contrast to the strong anti-consequentialist approach in moral absolutism and in the 
Strasbourg Court’s analysis. 
 Instead, Gewirth’s individual absolutism could be reinterpreted as simply lying at the 
most context-specific end of a non-consequentialist scale. Unfortunately, this takes us away 
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from any notion of general principle or rule: this arguably renders it inapposite in discourse 
on absolute human rights, which apply generally to all (or at least all within the legal order in 
which they are set out). Hare’s critique that high degrees of specificity may remove the 
quality of principles as guides to behaviour
81
 is relevant here and indicates the significance of 
the category of absolutism set out directly below. 
 3) Rule Absolutism: Gewirth identifies this as the intermediate level.  According to 
Gewirth, at this level what is non-displaceable is a specific rule that describes the content of 
the entitlement and the correlative duty (or duties): 
 
At this level, the rights whose absoluteness is in question are characterized in 
terms of specific objects with possible specification also of subjects and 
respondents, so that a specific rule can be stated describing the content of the 
right and the correlative duty. The description will not use proper names and 
other individual referring expressions, as in the case of Individual Absolutism, 
nor will it consist only in a general formula applicable to many specifically 
different kinds of rights and duties and hence of objects, subjects and 
respondents.
82
 
 
  As Gewirth puts it, ‘[i]t is at this level that one asks whether the right to life of all 
persons or of all innocent persons is absolute, whether the rights to freedom of speech and of 
religion are absolute, and so forth’.83 Indeed, this appears to encapsulate where the discourse 
on substantive human rights mainly lies,
84
 although we cannot neglect that constitutional 
rights are often formulated in a way that resembles principle absolutism – for instance, the 
right to dignity in the German Constitution
85
 – and that other legal rights are often formulated 
in a way that more closely resembles individual absolutism: for example, insofar as John (the 
seller) and Mary (the buyer) have a valid contract for the sale of a car and a valid contractual 
clause so provides, Mary has a right to take possession of the car upon payment of the price 
to John, etc. 
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Addo and Grief refer to Gewirth’s three levels,86 stating that:  
 
Gewirth's analysis is invaluable in assessing the notion of 'absolute right' in 
relation to Article 3 of the Convention. Article 3 can be said to be absolute in 
all senses of Gewirth's framework of analysis. However, such classifications 
remain at the level of generality. When attempting to apply them to specific 
circumstances, one has to take into account any factual and personal 
distinctions.
87
  
 
 This assessment does not draw the distinction between applicability and specification, 
although hinting at it, and so does not pinpoint how a potential interplay between the two 
informs or challenges any conception of absoluteness. Moreover, what is mentioned but 
largely left unaddressed is that the specification of the standard posited as absolute is 
significant because it sets the parameters of what is non-displaceable and unconditional: the 
boundaries of the ‘absolute’. The fact that specification sets out these boundaries means that 
both its degree and its bases are crucial. Their significance can be said to lie in three key 
elements: 
1. Specification has implications for a legal standard’s capacity to guide behaviour. 
2. Specification determines the scope of the absolute right. 
3. The bases of specification are linked to the way absoluteness can be affected by the 
interplay between applicability and specification. 
 Each of these aspects will be discussed in turn, in an attempt to set out the ground for 
rationalising some of the debate and critique surrounding the specification of absolute rights.  
 
Specification’s implications for a legal standard’s capacity to guide 
 
Generality and specificity are ultimately matters of degree.
88
 Indeed, although Gewirth’s 
‘grid’ is used as a tool through which to clarify the ECtHR’s discourse on Article 3, the use of 
classification based on that grid is an approximation on what is rather a spectrum of 
generality/specificity.  
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 At the same time, although a matter of degree, the range within the spectrum occupied 
by rule absolutism carries significance for the concept of a legally recognised human right.  
Legal theorists have variously described the law as consisting of commands,
89
 rules,
90
 
norms,
91
 principles
92
 etc, largely assuming or requiring a certain quality in these concepts:  at 
the least a capacity to guide behaviour.
93
 This element is arguably a sine qua non of any 
conception of the rule of law, despite significant disagreement on the rule of law’s further 
content. Certainly, this quality also is a matter of degree, but most jurists would probably 
agree that it is not sufficiently fulfilled at either of the two ends of the generality/specificity 
spectrum: a very general principle suffers from too much uncertainty and disagreement in its 
concrete application while a highly specified standard provides little ex ante guidance and is 
not ‘teachable and usable’.94  
 This issue is reflected in two of Fuller’s eight elements of law that are needed in a 
society aspiring to the rule of law: generality and clarity.
95
 Fuller considered that ‘the 
requirement of generality rests on the truism that to subject human conduct to the control of 
rules, there must be rules’.96 His mention of US regulatory agencies as an example of failure 
in this domain is instructive: ‘Like King Rex they were embarked on their careers in the belief 
that by proceeding at first case by case they would gradually gain an insight which would 
enable them to develop general standards of decision. In some cases this hope has been almost 
completely disappointed…’.97 
 This is a requirement easily transposed to a legal order conferring rights to individuals 
and imposing correlative obligations on the State: general standards are needed to guide both 
individuals – not least impecunious potential applicants to the ECtHR – and State officials. 
This is so especially in the context of a right so fundamental as to be absolute. Although for 
Fuller these are primarily requirements for legislation, his very example indicates that they are 
virtues necessary also in regulation and adjudication. 
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 At the same time, the requirement of clarity pulls towards some degree of specificity. 
As Fuller states, ‘[t]he desideratum of clarity represents one of the most essential ingredients 
of legality’.98 Although again set in the legislative context, Fuller’s analysis ultimately seeks 
clear standards by either legislators or adjudicators, as he tackles the issue surrounding legal 
provisions requiring what is ‘fair’ or ‘reasonable’: ‘A much needed chapter of jurisprudence 
remains at present largely unwritten. This chapter would devote itself to an analysis of the 
circumstances under which problems of governmental regulation may safely be assigned to 
adjudicative decision with a reasonable prospect that fairly clear standards of decision will 
emerge from a case-by-case treatment of controversies as they arise.’99  
 This highlights Fuller’s concern with clear standards to guide behaviour. Thus, the 
analysis indicates that a Court adjudicating on and specifying human rights, notably a right 
that must be fulfilled without exceptions, must carefully tread the line between over-
generality and over-specificity to ensure a sufficient level of both generality and clarity. It will 
be suggested below that the difficulties in treading this line are partly what troubles 
commentators.
100
 
 
Specification’s determination of the scope of a right 
 
It has been pointed out above that specification concretises and delimits the right. A prime 
basis for the critique of ‘specifying absolute rights’ in the way Shafer-Landau suggests is 
linked to the analysis above, on legal standards’ capacity to guide behaviour. As Shafer-
Landau acknowledges, Feinberg
101
 criticises this approach for the uncertainty it involves: 
nobody can offer a full specification of any right, so that all actors involved are ultimately 
ignorant about their rights and obligations. This mirrors the rule of law related problems with 
over-specification raised above in relation to individual-absolutism and high degrees of 
specificity in general, but also points to another fundamental problem in terms of how 
specification relates to absoluteness: the indefinite ‘narrowing’ of the right through 
specification. This is important: specification can narrow the scope of the right and its 
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correlative duty or duties such that what is in fact absolute is ultimately only a ‘fraction’ of 
what is at first sight considered such.  
 As part of what is perhaps one of the most famous theories of the specification of 
rights – although the word ‘specification’ is rarely used – Dworkin criticises Berlin’s 
influential idea of negative liberty,
102
 arguing that this broad conception of liberty and the idea 
of a corresponding broad right to liberty are not only inapposite, but absurd: ‘Indeed it seems 
to me absurd to suppose that men and women have any general right to liberty at all, at least 
as liberty has traditionally been conceived by its champions.’103 Dworkin means to narrow 
what we conceive to be our right to liberty in a way that fits within his broader thesis that 
liberty and equality are not competing values. Letsas interprets this in an instructive way. 
After setting out that we have a fundamental right not to be deprived of liberty or opportunity 
‘on the basis of certain considerations’ – it is unnecessary to set out these considerations at 
this point – Letsas posits that: ‘Rights thus understood are absolute: it can never become 
justified for the government to restrict my liberty for the reasons just mentioned… When 
these reasons are absent, we should not say that we have a right which is not absolute and 
whose limitation is justified. Rather, we should say that we had no right in the first place.’104 
 It is important to note here that theories such as Dworkin’s and Letsas’, supporting this 
idea of internal specification of rights rather than an ‘external’ balancing act, are linked to 
theorists’ particular views on the normative basis and role of human rights and human rights 
adjudication, the latter balancing act being linked to interest-based theories of rights
105
 and the 
former approach to what Letsas describes as of an ‘agent-relative’ character.106 There is 
insufficient space to cover the disagreement in depth, except to mention that interest-based 
theories more easily accommodate ideas of balancing – or proportionality, a related concept 
and relevant in relation to consequentialist reasoning and ‘qualified’ rights under the ECHR107 
– than agent-relative theories.  
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 What must be highlighted is that the combination of uncertainty, criticised above, and 
narrowing, means that internal specification carries the wider danger of indefinite narrowing, 
such that rights we may think we have end up, in practice, being specified out of our right in 
what can be viewed as an ex post fashion (usually by the relevant Court). This could be a 
critique launched against US adjudication on the First Amendment,
108
 which admits of no 
qualifications on its face, and what, to some extent perhaps, Dworkin is seeking to rationalise. 
It is important therefore to be aware of specification’s capacity to narrow and to do so in a 
potentially uncertain manner and to an uncertain degree.  
  
Bases of specification and the interplay between specification and applicability 
 
Compounding the above, another crucial challenge is that regarding the nature and basis of 
specifications: primarily, setting out what are legitimate and illegitimate specifications and 
how these are to be determined. Herein lies the potential of specifications bringing in 
consequentialist considerations internally – that is, in the content of the right – in a way that 
undermines the applicability criterion. This is arguably what is of the utmost concern to 
commentators such as Feldman in referring to the issue of ‘relativism’.109 Indeed, although 
this cannot be delved into in depth here, this appears to be a live issue in UK adjudication on 
Article 3, particularly in relation to deportation and extradition cases and notably Wellington, 
where a ‘relativist’ approach is adopted by certain judges in specifying the UK’s obligations 
under Article 3 in such contexts, such that a ‘heightened standard for contravention of article 
3 [is required] in its application to extradition cases’.110 The issue is also raised by two recent 
decisions of the Fourth Section of the ECtHR in relation to expulsion.
111
 
 Gewirth himself recognises that, even at the level of rule absolutism, the rule may 
come at a different level of specificity: from the right of all persons to life, to ‘the right of all 
innocent persons to an economically secure life’112 etc. He acknowledges that specifications 
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may be seen as exceptions to the more general right in a way that challenges what I have 
labelled the applicability criterion of absoluteness. He posits that ‘not all specifications of the 
subjects, objects or respondents of moral rights constitute the kinds of exception whose 
applicability to a right debars it from being absolute’.113 In order for specifications not to 
offend against the applicability criterion, Gewirth suggests that such specifications must fulfil 
three requirements: they must amount to concepts that are recognisable in ordinary practical 
thinking, be justifiable through a valid moral principle and exclude reference to the 
consequences of fulfilling the right.
114
 Further analysis of this can help unlock the interplay 
between legitimate specifications and the applicability criterion. 
 The first requirement, the need for specifications to be made up of concepts 
recognisable in ordinary practical thinking, is meant, as far as Gewirth is concerned, to 
exclude rights that are ‘overloaded with exceptions’ or based on intricate utilitarian 
considerations. This requirement appeals rather to certainty and the ideal that the formulation 
of the right should have the capacity to guide, something that is lost through over-generality 
and over-specification, as discussed above. Substantive concerns regarding ‘exceptions’ and 
consequentialist considerations are examined in relation to the third requirement below. 
 Gewirth’s requirement of justifiability through a valid moral principle appears at first 
sight more difficult to transpose to a discourse on legally enforced rights. It is impossible to 
do justice to the wealth of debate surrounding law’s links with morality, but suffice it to say 
that there is significant disagreement on if and how far the law is linked to or imbued with 
moral principles and, if so, where these can be found and who should have the final say on 
what they require. Nonetheless, this requirement can be adapted sufficiently, especially in the 
context of human rights, in a way that gives some idea of what we should be looking for but 
also highlights the immense difficulties in pinning it down. For Gewirth, the criterion is 
indissolubly linked with and meant to be a pre-requisite for the moral justifiability of 
absoluteness (in the sense of the applicability parameter). This may seem at first sight 
unnecessary for our purposes since what is being dealt with here is a right that is recognised 
as absolute – that is, not capable of being overridden – at law. Yet what must not be neglected 
is the significance of the reasons why this right is absolute. Indeed, arguably the challenge for 
the Court in specifying such a right and its correlative duties is to do so in a way that remains 
loyal to the bases not only for the right’s protection, but for its inviolable protection.  
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 Gewirth, for instance, considers that there is ‘a good moral justification for 
incorporating the restriction of innocence on the subjects of the right not to be killed’,115 but 
no such similarly sound moral justification for incorporating racial or religious specifications. 
In the context of Article 3, the ECtHR’s statements that the victim’s conduct does not affect 
the applicability of the right set up a different standard, yet serve to highlight that the 
question of what the legitimate specifications for Article 3 are goes to the root of what it is 
there to protect and safeguard. Unfortunately, the length of this article does not allow full 
exploration of this question, but the Strasbourg Court’s mindfulness of the need for Article 
3’s specification to reflect its underlying values and the reasons for its absolute nature, as 
well as some of the difficulties involved, are highlighted briefly below. 
 Gewirth’s last requirement is that: 
 
[T]he permissible specification of a right must exclude any reference to the 
possibly disastrous consequences of fulfilling the right. Since a chief difficulty 
posed against absolute rights is that for any right there can be cases in which its 
fulfilment may have disastrous consequences, to put this reference into the 
very description of the right would remove one of the main grounds for raising 
the question of absoluteness.
116
  
 
 In essence, Gewirth here points out that specification of an absolute right should not 
remove the applicability criterion through the back door. Indeed, any specifications 
incorporating consequentialist concerns operate in a way that could be called ‘internal 
displacement’ of the right. As such, this constitutes illegitimate interplay between the 
applicability and the specification parameters of an absolute right. Thus, formulating an 
allegedly absolute right as the ‘right of everyone except a person who has kidnapped a child 
whose whereabouts are unknown not to be subjected to torture or inhuman treatment’ would 
be an example of such illegitimate interplay. Similarly, an interpretation to the effect that a 
particular treatment, considered inhuman if inflicted on adults and children alike, is not 
considered to be inhuman if inflicted on a terrorist or someone subject to a deportation or 
extradition order, would also amount to illegitimate specification.  
 The line of legitimate specifications arguably becomes particularly difficult to tread in 
the realm of positive obligations. Positive obligations cannot logically be without limit, in the 
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sense that the State cannot sensibly be subject to a ‘strict liability’:117 to put it crudely, in the 
context of Article 3, for example, not every rape or severe beating within its territory could 
amount to infringement of the right by the State. Moreover, as highlighted above, it is 
problematic to accept that positive obligations can include taking direct action in violation of 
the negative obligation of an absolute right. Arguably, positive measures to protect the 
entitlement encompassed by an absolute right are always required, though they may be of 
limited – that is, not boundless – scope. As discussed in addressing the issues surrounding the 
applicability criterion, above, the specification of positive obligations cannot but encompass 
such fluid wording as ‘reasonable steps’, reflecting a flexibility and also an inevitable 
uncertainty in the ways in which individuals may be considered to be protected effectively. 
At the same time, the question whether such terms as ‘reasonable steps’ encompass a 
consequentialist assessment is significant. It highlights the possibility that the process of 
delimiting positive obligations may be seen as ‘internal displacement’ of some sort, at odds 
with the applicability criterion.  
 Thus, difficult questions arise as to how and on what basis the ECtHR draws the 
boundaries of positive obligations and how that relates to the applicability criterion of 
absoluteness. Only some bare indications of the ECtHR’s approach can be mentioned below, 
yet this project is an important follow-up task of the author. 
  
The specification parameter: ECtHR case law 
 
Article 3 is primarily delimited by the specification of the treatment it proscribes. 
Commentators have described Article 3 as encompassing three ‘types’ or levels of proscribed 
treatment,
118
 although up to five could be drawn out of the wording of the Article: torture; 
inhuman treatment; degrading treatment; inhuman punishment; and degrading punishment. 
The Court does not always clarify precisely which type of treatment has occurred in cases of 
breach,
119
 but the focus tends to lie on the thresholds that separate Article 3 types of treatment 
from treatment that falls outside the prohibition in Article 3, as well as on the threshold that 
separates torture from other types of Article 3 treatment.
120
 These will be looked at in an 
effort to assess the Court’s specification of what Article 3 proscribes (the negative duty) as it 
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relates to the above framework, followed by a brief outline of the Court’s approach to 
positive obligations.  
 
(i) The threshold(s) between prohibited Article 3 treatment and treatment falling outside the 
prohibition in Article 3 
 
An oft-quoted test for inhuman treatment is the ‘Pretty’ test, which requires ‘"ill-treatment" 
that attains a minimum level of severity and involves actual bodily injury or intense physical 
or mental suffering.’121 This test draws from the earlier case of Ireland v United Kingdom, 
where the guidance given was that ‘[t]he assessment of this minimum is, in the nature of 
things, relative; it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the 
treatment, its physical or mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of 
the victim, etc’.122 Reference tends to be made to the ‘nature and context of the treatment’123 
as ‘circumstances of the case’.  
 There are two elements to the test. The ‘severity of treatment’ element appears to 
focus on the perpetrator’s acts and intentions, while the ‘intensity of suffering’ element 
purports to focus on the victim and his or her subjective experience of the treatment. The 
determination of whether the threshold of minimum level of severity of treatment or intensity 
of suffering has been crossed involves multiple uncertainty: first, the ‘intensity of suffering’ 
test is considered by the Court to be one of degree, with guidance of how intensity is 
measured to be found in the Court’s assessment of the facts on a case-by-case basis and with 
no line being drawn – or seemingly capable of being drawn – ex ante; secondly, the degree 
itself depends on open-ended variables including such broad concepts as the ‘nature and 
context’ of the treatment, whose role appears often to be crucial despite the significant 
difficulty in pinning them down. For instance, although the ECtHR has established that the 
psychological trauma on relatives of people detained and tortured or killed by security forces 
could amount to inhuman treatment,
124
 it has found inhuman treatment to have been suffered 
in such context by the mother of a victim
125
 but not, in similar circumstances, by the brother 
of a victim.
126
 The ‘severity of treatment’ aspect appears similarly open-ended. 
 As such, the ECtHR’s approach seems to elude Gewirth’s favoured intermediate 
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concept of ‘Rule Absolutism’. The prohibition opens into a number of diverse variables 
collapsing into uncertain context-specific outcomes, with specification occurring on the 
ECtHR’s assessment of the facts of the particular case. In fact, at the ex ante stage, the 
prohibition resembles more closely the concept of ‘Principle Absolutism’, with the guidance 
being general and the actual assessment of facts stated broadly to be relative. On the other 
hand, at the ex post facto stage the right ends up resembling ‘Individual Absolutism’: the 
individual complainant is found to have been entitled not to be treated in the way he or she 
was, in the given context, timing and other circumstances. The problems raised are as 
highlighted in the analysis above, creating significant uncertainty and difficulty in securing ex 
ante respect for an absolute right. Together with the problem of indefinite narrowing, these 
arguably underline commentators’ concerns, raised above.127  
 Given the broad ‘relative’ assessment involved, an important question is how the line 
is drawn between what are legitimate factors and what are illegitimate factors to take into 
account. For example, it is difficult to assess whether and how far punching a handcuffed, 
powerless adult convicted terrorist is to be differentiated from punching a powerless innocent 
child and, if so, on what basis. Furthermore, if such a distinction is made, can the difference 
established by such a distinction be decisive in separating Article 3 proscribed ill-treatment 
from treatment falling outside the Article 3 prohibition? Presumably it can be. The question 
then arises – and arguably underlies commentators’ scepticism – as to whether such 
differentiation can offend the applicability criterion of absoluteness as set out by the Court, 
since the idea is that Article 3 is applicable no matter what, disregarding among others any 
particular characteristic or conduct of the victim.   
 The following can be said in response to the scepticism outlined above. First, the 
applicability of Article 3 can be distinguished from the ‘relative’ assessment of whether the 
Pretty threshold has been crossed, which is a matter of specification. The latter assessment 
can legitimately incorporate certain characteristics of the victim insofar as they impact on the 
degree of suffering experienced and/or severity of treatment inflicted. Yet if they were to turn 
into bases of displacing fully or to an extent the operation of Article 3 – a crude example 
would be the suggestion that a higher threshold of suffering must be crossed if the victim is a 
terrorist – this would offend against the applicability criterion. Herein lies the misconceived 
‘relativist’ approach taken by key members of the UK judiciary in Wellington in relation to 
persons subject to extradition orders:
128
 it traverses the distinction between applicability and 
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specification under Article 3 in a way that undermines the applicability parameter, which 
goes to the core of its absolute nature. A more pronounced example where this distinction 
becomes important is in the context of Article 3-proscribed punishment, discussed below. 
 Degrading treatment is described in Pretty as occurring ‘[w]here treatment humiliates 
or debases an individual showing a lack of respect for, or diminishing, his or her human 
dignity or arouses feelings of fear, anguish or inferiority capable of breaking an individual's 
moral and physical resistance’.129 The Court follows this up with the noncommittal ‘may be 
characterised as degrading and also fall within the definition of Article 3’,130 despite the fact 
that this was considered decisive towards the finding of ‘degrading treatment’ in Ireland v 
United Kingdom.
131
 Discrimination which amounts to an ‘affront to human dignity’ may also 
constitute ‘degrading treatment’ proscribed by Article 3, as put forth by the Commission 
(during its operative years) in the East African Asians case,
132
 and applied by the ECtHR in 
Cyprus v Turkey.
133
 At the same time, the ECtHR appears to have super-imposed a test of 
degree, so that, in the context of either treatment or punishment, the suffering must ‘attain a 
particular level’134 and ‘must go beyond that inevitable element of suffering or humiliation 
connected with a given form of legitimate treatment or punishment’.135 
 An attempt to apply the right in light of its underlying values, significant with regard 
to the analysis on legitimate specification above, is apparent in the Court’s repeated allusions 
to human dignity and with the Court showing sensitivity to individuals’ sense of integrity and 
self-worth. These attempts are important and commendable, given that the Court is grappling 
with contestable, evaluative standards which it must nonetheless do its best to interpret.
136
 
Yet it appears from the above excerpts that use of the word ‘may’ reflects a refusal to 
ascertain in advance a hard and fast rule as to what treatment will fall within the proscribed 
Article 3 category of degrading treatment and what will not. Although this retains sufficient 
flexibility to address a number of diverse situations, the problems of uncertainty and 
narrowing are again prominent and the category of Rule Absolutism is potentially elided. 
This could be said to be exacerbated by the fact that concepts such as ‘human dignity’ are 
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widely viewed as at best open to interpretation and at worst as indeterminate
137
 or open to 
judicial discretion.
138
 Most problematically, the Court’s allusion to treatment going beyond 
‘legitimate’ treatment/punishment begs the question of legitimate specifications perhaps more 
than it answers it. This uncertainty is particularly problematic, given that therein lies the 
potential for the sort of consequentialist reasoning that may undermine the applicability 
parameter. 
 Regarding punishment, the ECtHR does not often differentiate between the ‘inhuman’ 
and the ‘degrading’. In Soering v United Kingdom it simply refers to punishment being 
brought ‘within the proscription under Article 3’,139 while in Keenan v United Kingdom it 
largely adopts the tests for inhuman and degrading treatment before finding that a severe 
disciplinary punishment imposed on a person known to be a suicide risk in those particular 
circumstances amounted to ‘inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment within the 
meaning of Article 3 of the Convention’.140 
 Nonetheless, the ECtHR establishes distinctions in Tyrer v United Kingdom.
141
 It 
distinguishes ‘punishment’ from ‘treatment’142 and proceeds to draw a distinction between 
‘inhuman punishment’ and ‘degrading punishment’, stipulating that ‘inhuman punishment’ 
requires that ‘the suffering occasioned must attain a particular level’,143 thus incorporating the 
quantitative test employed for inhuman treatment and finding the birching of the complainant 
to fall beneath that level. It then adopts an interesting approach to ‘degrading punishment’. 
Acknowledging the element of ‘humiliation’ potentially inherent in any punishment, it 
explains that  ‘[i]t would be absurd to hold that judicial punishment generally, by reason of its 
usual and perhaps almost inevitable element of humiliation, is “degrading” within the 
meaning of Article 3’,144 reaffirming the quantitative test employed for degrading treatment 
by suggesting that the humiliation or debasement involved must reach ‘a particular level’.145 
The assessment of whether this level has been reached is, ‘in the nature of things, relative: it 
depends on all the circumstances of the case and, in particular, on the nature and context of 
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the punishment itself and the manner and method of its execution’,146 echoing the approach 
on inhuman treatment. 
 Crucially, in light of the third requirement for legitimate specifications and the wider 
issue of interplay between applicability and specification addressed above, the ECtHR rejects 
the idea that the deterrent effect of the punishment can legitimise it, stating clearly in Tyrer 
that punishments contrary to Article 3 are never permissible regardless of their deterrent 
effect.
147
 This clarifies that consequentialist concerns cannot render conduct that is inhuman 
or degrading lawful or justified, in other words, they cannot displace the rights and 
obligations under Article 3, ensuring respect for the applicability criterion. 
 Nonetheless, in the definition of these crucial terms, the ECtHR’s application of its 
‘nature and context’ assessment exposes once again the high number of variables 
incorporated in the specification parameter of Article 3, leading to a variability of outcomes. 
For example, in assessing ‘all the circumstances’, the Court in Tyrer places emphasis on the 
institutional character of the punishment, suggesting that, despite the lack of severe physical 
suffering, the institutionalised nature of the violence renders the punishment an assault on the 
complainant’s dignity and hence a violation of Article 3: ‘his punishment— whereby he was 
treated as an object in the power of the authorities— constituted an assault on precisely that 
which it is one of the main purposes of Article 3 to protect, namely a person's dignity and 
physical integrity.’148 Since, only paragraphs above, the institutionalised nature of 
punishment was presented as a generic feature requiring something more to amount to 
‘degrading punishment’ under Article 3, it may appear dubious that the  institutionalised 
‘nature and context’ of the punishment pushed it above the Article 3 threshold.  
 At the same time, the ECtHR’s efforts – in line with the second legitimate 
specification requirement, outlined above – to interpret Article 3 in light of its underlying 
values, especially dignity, are again apparent. As stated above, although underscored by the 
aforementioned uncertainty surrounding the particular value, this is commendable, as it 
shows the ECtHR engaging openly with the difficult concepts at hand. 
 Moreover, it can be argued that the Court’s highly contextual approach on whether 
punishment reaches the Article 3 threshold is inevitable and even necessary. Indeed, in 
determining whether punishment is inhuman or degrading, the conduct of the victim, and the 
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proportionality of the punishment
149
 – a test that is, of course, to be distinguished from the 
proportionality test in wider human rights discourse – to such conduct, are crucial. Thus, a 
term of 10 years imprisonment in a standard adult prison meted out to a 30-year-old man 
convicted of armed robbery and a disabled 70-year-old man convicted of tax evasion are 
legitimately distinguished. This ‘relativism’ does not undermine the applicability criterion but 
lies within the legitimate specification of Article 3. Sceptics must, once again, acknowledge 
this. At the same time, a comprehensive study on the legitimacy of specifications in the 
context of punishment proscribed by Article 3 is a vast and difficult endeavour, which cannot 
be covered in the space of this article, though the discussion above may provide food for 
thought for the analysis of current case law on the subject.
150
  
 
(ii) The threshold between torture and other forms of proscribed Article 3 treatment 
 
The Court has consistently reiterated the idea that ‘the Convention, with its distinction 
between “torture” and “inhuman or degrading treatment”, should by the first of these terms 
attach a special stigma to deliberate inhuman treatment causing very serious and cruel 
suffering’.151 In Ireland v United Kingdom, the Court suggests that the distinction ‘derives 
principally from a difference in the intensity of the suffering inflicted’.152 The original 
differentiation made therefore appears largely quantitative, but contains the added element of 
intent. This element in the ECtHR’s definition of torture appears to encompass deliberate 
cruelty – that is, an intention to cause suffering.  The Court’s (perhaps wishful) distinction 
between deliberate cruelty and the forceful administration of emetics to the applicant in 
Jalloh v Germany is instructive: ‘Although this was not the intention, the measure was 
implemented in a way which caused the applicant both physical pain and mental suffering. 
He has therefore been subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment contrary to Article 3.’153 
It can be said that this sets up a clear point of distinction with inhuman and/or degrading 
treatment, where such intentional cruelty is a notable but not necessary factor.
154
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 Moreover, in line with the UN Convention Against Torture,
155
 the Grand Chamber of 
the ECtHR has recently adopted a further point of distinction, acknowledging ‘a purposive 
element as recognised in the United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment…which defines torture in terms of the 
intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering with the aim, inter alia, of obtaining 
information, inflicting punishment or intimidating.
156
 Thus, there are two layers of intent key 
to establishing torture: intent to cause suffering and intent to attain a certain end through the 
causing of such suffering. 
 The ECtHR has also made it clear that the threshold that separates torture from other 
forms of proscribed treatment will continue to shift, stating that, given that the Convention is 
a ‘living instrument which must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions’,157 it 
considers that ‘certain acts which were classified in the past as “inhuman and degrading 
treatment” as opposed to “torture” could be classified differently in future’.158 
 There is significant uncertainty, therefore, surrounding this threshold also. The 
‘severity of treatment’/‘intensity of suffering’ test appears once again to make an important 
part of this threshold a question of degree. Moreover, it remains unspecified whether only 
institutional infliction of or involvement in such treatment with such intent is captured by 
‘torture’, the latter being a broad requirement under the UN Convention Against Torture.159 
Lastly, the element of progressive interpretation of the Convention as a living instrument 
could be said to be a legitimate reflection of the increasingly high standards expected of 
states in respect for human rights, but nonetheless compounds the uncertainty involved in 
establishing what is absolutely prohibited and so strongly stigmatised. It also raises the 
question of what the values underlying the prohibition of torture are and how far they should 
be linked to State or popular consensus.
160
  
 At the same time, a broader question surrounding this threshold is the way it relates to 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
of any such purpose cannot conclusively rule out a finding of violation of art.3’. See MSS v Belgium and Greece 
53 EHRR 2 at para 220; and V v United Kingdom 30 EHRR 121 at para 71. 
155
 See Article 1 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
1984, UNTS 1465. 
156
 Salman v Turkey 2000-VII; 34 EHRR 17 at para 114. 
157
 Here the ECtHR draws on previous case law: see Tyrer v United Kingdom, supra n 134 at para 31; Soering v 
United Kingdom, supra n 139 at para 102; and Loizidou v Turkey, supra n 20 at para 71. 
158
 Selmouni v France 1999-V; 29 EHRR 403 at para 101. 
159
 Supra n 155. 
160
 For a critical perspective on the ‘living instrument’ approach, see Letsas, A theory of interpretation of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) at 74; cf Dzehtsiarou, 
‘European Consensus and the Evolutive Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2011) 12 
German Law Journal 1730. 
36 
 
the applicability parameter. The ECtHR’s discourse appears to approach all (five) types of 
treatment covered by Article 3 as unjustifiable and therefore absolute as per the applicability 
parameter. Even if they reflect a spectrum of wrongfulness,
161
 torture in particular carrying 
more stigma, they are all prohibited no matter what. Yet the distinction in the approach to 
admissibility of real evidence obtained by torture as against real evidence obtained through 
other forms of proscribed Article 3 treatment in Gäfgen
162
 appears to introduce an impact-
loaded hierarchy in the context of Article 3’s relationship with Article 6 ECHR, which 
provides for the right to a fair trial.
163
 This raises the question whether the drawing of such 
hierarchies, which go beyond the mere element of added stigma carried by the label ‘torture’, 
undermines the applicability parameter by making ‘lesser’ forms of ill-treatment appear 
potentially justifiable, at least in an Article 6 context. The length of this article does not allow 
further analysis of this but it must be noted as a significant concern for followers of 
Strasbourg jurisprudence.  
 
(iii) Positive obligations under Article 3 
 
 
The above indicates that the negative obligation, although approached in a relatively 
straightforward manner by the ECtHR in regard to the applicability criterion, raises 
significant problems in the realm of specification. The difficulties multiply in the sphere of 
positive obligations. 
 The issue of positive obligations only kicks in when proscribed treatment or suffering 
is involved. Positive obligations arise, for example, in relation to the adequacy of the criminal 
law and the criminal justice system in protecting individuals from suffering proscribed 
treatment at the hands of non-State agents;
164
 in relation to conditions of imprisonment and 
the provision of medical assistance to those in prison;
165
 in the requirement to protect 
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vulnerable persons at known risk of suffering Article 3 treatment;
166
 and in the form of a 
requirement to investigate plausible complaints of the proscribed treatment.
167
 The same 
concerns regarding the definition of what is proscribed touch positive obligations also. 
Further problems surround the specification and delimitation of the type and extent of duties 
triggered.  
 The procedural positive obligation, the duty of investigation, embodies the 
recognition of the importance of enforcing the absolute prohibition under Article 3 (on the 
applicability criterion), a point highlighted in the discussion on applicability above. It is a 
firm and relatively straightforward aspect of the Court’s case law, focusing on effective 
apportionment of blame and establishment of facts, though its precise parameters merit 
examination in more detail in a follow-up discussion of positive obligations.  
 Beyond the procedural duty, several problems arise. A key problem is that of defining 
the notion of ‘adequate measures’168 or ‘reasonable steps’169 required to fulfil the positive 
obligation triggered in a given case. These concepts give rise to the clarity-related problems 
outlined by Fuller
170
 and ultimately lead to what is once again an ex post contextual 
assessment. More crucially, they raise the question of how far consequentialist or cost-based 
concerns should inform the interpretation of what is adequate or reasonable. Certainly, 
resource-related concerns appear to underlie the ECtHR’s approach in N v United Kingdom, 
where the Court alludes to the ‘search for a fair balance between the demands of the general 
interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual’s 
fundamental rights’.171 They also seem to lie behind the Court’s reluctance to take Article 3 
duties too far into the socio-economic realm.
172
  
 Given the above framework and analysis, it is evident that the multiple questions 
raised in the specification of positive obligations in relation to the interplay between 
specification and applicability, particularly surrounding consequentialist reasoning, are very 
significant. Hopefully, this article serves to highlight this significance and spark critical 
discussion on these questions. Given the breadth of the subject, these questions will be 
pursued further in a follow-up work.  
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Conclusion 
 
The above analysis distinguishes between the applicability and specification parameters of an 
absolute right with a view to clarifying the discourse on this topic and providing a coherent 
groundwork for exploring the ECtHR’s interpretation of Article 3 ECHR as it relates to the 
right’s absolute nature. I suggest that three questions appear to be central in the debate 
regarding absoluteness, and the theoretical framework I offer is with a view to helping 
address these. The questions are intertwined in many ways. The first question concerns the 
key implications of a right’s absolute nature on the obligations it encompasses, to which the 
applicability parameter offers the primary answer: the obligations encompassed by an 
absolute right cannot be displaced by consequentialist concerns of any sort. In ECtHR 
analysis, once Article 3 applies, it applies no matter what. Herein lies the crux of what it 
means for a right to be absolute. This, however, highlights the significance of the definitional 
questions.  
 The second question, referring to the substance of the obligations encompassed by an 
absolute right, is addressed by looking at the significance of specification.  An attempt has 
been made to highlight issues of particular significance and difficulty within the parameter of 
specification, both in theory and in the Strasbourg Court’s discourse. Lastly, the question 
concerning the role of ‘relativism’ in interpreting an absolute right such as Article 3 is 
addressed by highlighting the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate specifications, 
the latter bringing in considerations that undermine the applicability parameter. On the 
account provided above, a contextual approach does not necessarily constitute illegitimate 
specification – in fact, sensitivity to the particulars of a situation is necessary in applying 
concepts such as inhuman and degrading treatment.  
 Crucially, the above analysis suggests that the specification of Article 3 must remain 
faithful to the basis of its absolute nature and the importance of safeguarding it, and 
highlights the ECtHR’s attempt to interpret and apply Article 3 in light of its underlying 
values. In doing so, it seeks to create space for a more conceptually coherent in-depth 
exploration of the basis for the absolute protection of Article 3 and the ways in which the 
values that underlie Article 3, as well as its absolute nature, inform and should inform the 
specification of its content. 
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